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Norway has the world's second highest electricity consumption per capita (International 
Energy Agency, n.d.). Increased electrification of society services is expected to push peak 
consumption to higher levels than its current state. This will challenge the current grid capacity 
and might require upgrade investments. However, efficient usage of the current capacity might 
contribute to postponing these costly investments. One of the instruments to achieve this 
efficiency is designing a new grid tariff. Elvia, the biggest Norwegian distribution system 
operator is testing a new Time of Use tariff on a random sample  of 4505 residential customers. 
Four strategies have been used to communicate the tariff. This thesis estimates the effect of 
the interaction of Time of Use tariff and the communication strategies, in comparison to a 
control group by using the Difference in Differences method. The results show that appealing 
only to the economic sense was not sufficient to reduce peak consumption, while 
environmental and social pressure focused messages have higher effect. Limitations and 
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Green policies and technological developments are pushing the power system through drastic 
changes by influencing how we produce and consume electricity. 
 
The power grid transmits electricity from the production sites to the end users.  The share of 
non-dispatchable energy resources such as photovoltaic and wind, is expected to increase as a 
part of the energy production mix. Meanwhile, the electrification of many societies’ sectors 
makes us consume more electricity with a trend that is expected to rise. 
 
The supply and demand of electricity within a power system must stay in balance (Energy 
facts Norway, 2019). The energy output from non-dispatchable resources is intermittent and 
uncertain. With the increasing share of such resources, system uncertainty is increasing and 
keeping supply and demand in balance is becoming harder. This imbalance between supply 
and demand can disturb the service quality and security provided by the power grids (Statnett, 
2018). On the other hand, it is not possible to transport electricity to the end users more than 
the designed capacity of the grid. 
 
Typically, the electric grid is designed to be able to handle both expected short- and long-term 
variability in demand and supply and to handle projected peaks in electricity demand (Uddin 
et al., 2018). Maintenance and upgrading the grid capacity with a goal of accommodating the 
increasing share of variable renewable power resources and handling expected maximum peak 
time is costly and economically inefficient, due to the fact that the grid is fully utilized only a 
few hours per year. These costs are financed mainly by the users of the grid. In 2020, the 
estimated distribution net costs were 13.9 billion NOK in Norway (Eriksen & Mook, 2020). 
Therefore, optimal use of the grid means less costs for users since grid reinforcements can be 
postponed. This puts pressure on grid operators to implement flexibility in the demand side in 
order to optimize the usage of the existing capacity of the grid instead of upgrading it. 
 
One of the tools for activating demand side flexibility, is by using a price signal via the grid 
tariff to affect users’ consumption patterns. The current structure of grid tariff consists of a 
fixed part which is paid regardless of how much electricity a user consumes, and a variable 
part which relates to the electricity consumption; however, this variable part does not reflect 
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the time of use. Meaning that if two customers use the same amount of electricity but one uses 
it at a time of peak load and the other uses it at a time of off-peak load, they will pay the same 
amount of money. Therefore, the current structure does not reflect the grid capacity investment 
and maintenance costs needed for each customer’s pattern of use and does not incentivize 
customers for optimal use of the grid capacity. 
 
Elvia is the biggest Distribution System Operator (DSO) in Norway. Its grid covers an area of 
almost 50 000 km2 and delivers electricity to around 900 000 households. Elvia is considering 
changing the structure of the existing grid tariff. To do this, Elvia designed a field experimental 
study to test the effect of a Time of Use (TOU) tariff and different communication strategies 
to communicate this new tariff to the end users. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to measure the effect of the suggested new tariff and of four strategies 
to communicate the change to the customers. This thesis will add to the existing literature by 
presenting results from a completely new dataset, which has larger sample size compared to 
previous studies, and investigating the effect of different communication strategies. Some of 
the studies presented in the literature review struggle with biased samples, which is dealt with 
in this study through random sampling and random assignment of treatment. Also, as most of 
the literature we review is approximately 10 years old as this point, the results from Elvia’s 
pilot should better reflect the effect of TOU and communication strategies in the current 
market, which is rapidly changing due to the increasing number of EV in Norway and the 
introduction of smart appliances.  
 
The thesis structure is as follows: The second chapter aims to give the reader the necessary 
background in electricity systems to understand the root of the problem that TOU is trying to 
solve with a focus on the structure of the Norwegian system. The chapter gives an overview 
of the available strategies that can be a solution for the existing issues in the Norwegian power 
system. In chapter 3, we review the previous studies that document previous implementations 
of TOU tariff and interventions on how to reduce energy usage. In chapters 4, we 
describe Elvia’s experiment design.  Chapter 5, we elaborate on our choice of statistical 
technique, and illustrate the statistical results. In chapter 6, we discuss the results in the light 
of internal and external validity and the literature. Furthermore, we discuss the limitation of 




 The Electrical Grid 
The electric grid is a network that works for delivering electricity from the production (supply) 
sides to the demand/load (consumption) sides (See Figure 2.1). The grid can be classified into 
two types: The transmission grid and the distribution grid. The transmission grid typically 
covers a large geographical area and is characterized by high voltage levels to transfer the 
electricity from the production sides to substations, whereas the distribution grid is 
characterized by low voltage levels to transfer the electricity from substation to the end 
consumer where the purpose of consumption might be industrial, commercial, or residential 
(Blume, 2016). 
 
In Norway, most customers have smart meters that measure power flow from and to the grid. 
The hourly meter readings are sent throughout the day to the DSO. Transmission grids are 
managed by a Transmission System Operator (TSO), which is Statnett in Norway, while the 
distribution grid is managed by a DSO, e.g., Elvia. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - The Electrical Grid. Inspired by Fig. 1.1 in Blume (2016): From left to 
right: Generation side, Transmission, Distribution and Demand side. 
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A basic characteristic of the electricity system is that supply must always match demand. 
Imbalances between supply and load can degrade system frequency stability. TSOs are 
responsible for keeping system frequency at a specific level within allowed variations (Haug, 
2019). Extreme frequency variation that exceeds the allowed limits can lead to lifetime 
degradation or failure of grid’s equipment. TSOs manage imbalances by enhancing system 
inertia. A power system that has high inertia is the one that is resilient and capable of 
continuing provision of quality service despite sudden disturbances (Statnett, 2018). TSOs 
stabilize system frequency by controlling the supply side. This is done by ramping up or down 
the electric generation as a response to frequency changes (Drax, 2021). Renewable energy 
resources like wind and solar lack inertia as they are difficult to control in comparison to 
traditional resources. 
 
Imbalances between generation and load, in parallel with increased load levels impose 
challenges to DSOs as well. These challenges can be materialized into two main problems: 
voltage and congestion (Huang et al., 2016). The former refers to voltage levels exceeding its 
variation limits due to system imbalance, the latter refers to the situations where the existing 
physical grid capabilities are unable to accommodate the required load (Khani et al 2018). 
This can result in violations of system components’ thermal limits. The traditional solution to 
these problems is reinforcing grid capacity by, for example, adding parallel lines and 
transformers. 
 The Norwegian Electricity System 
In this section we will discuss the current structure of the demand and supply side of the 
Norwegian electricity system. The section highlights the vulnerabilities of the current structure 
and how it is expected to be developed in the future, and why it is important to try to change 
the behavior of residential consumers through TOU. 
2.2.1 Demand Side 
Norway is ranked as second in world in terms of electricity consumption per capita 
(International Energy Agency, n.d.). While the Norwegian production capacity can respond to 
such high demand, the grid must be dimensioned to transmit it. Problems arise when there is 
a very high electric load within short periods like hours or even minutes. Peak load is the 
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highest electrical power demand that has occurred over a specified time period (Gönen, 2008). 
Reducing peak load is important for reasons such as: 
 
 Cost reduction 
Generally, the power grid is designed to meet the maximum projected peak. Since peaks occur 
occasionally, it is not feasible economically to design the grid to accommodate higher than the 
usual needed capacity. Therefore, peak shaving will ensure that transmission and distribution 
systems are used efficiently. This will result in postponing system upgrading investment and 
extend the system's components life span. (Yan et al., 2014). 
 
 System efficiency: 
To meet peak load, supply current needs to be increased. However, as the current flowing 
through transmission lines increases, the power loss increases at a nonlinear rate. 
Power loss can be estimated as follows (Ha et al., 2014): 
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼2 × 𝑅 
 
 
Where I is the current and R is the ohmic resistance of the lines. 
 
Increasing the supply current will reduce the system efficiency, as power loss is proportionally 
related to the square of the current. Therefore, reducing peak demand would reduce system 
loss and improve the system efficiency (Kalkhambkar et al, 2016). 
 
Until the time of writing this line, the maximum peak in Norway was on 12 February 2021 
between 09:00 and 10:00 (Lund, 2021). It has a recorded consumption of  25 230 MWh 
(Statnett, 2021). In 1990 the maximum peak was 18 420 MWh (The Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate, 2019). That constitutes a 37% increase. Figure 2.2 shows 




Figure 2.2 - Maximum registered hourly electricity peak in Norway from 1990 – 




2.2.2 Generation Side (Supply Side) 
The Norwegian energy mix consists of 89% hydropower, 8% wind turbines and 3% other 
resources such as gas and solar based production (The Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate, 2021b). Generally, the ease of integration of renewable energy resources 
into the power grid depends mainly on three factors: dispatchability, predictability, and the 
storage capacity factor (Skar et al., 2018). Dispatchability refers to generators' theoretical 
ability to adjust their power output according to an order based on market needs. Different 
power generators vary in the time needed for adjusting their output. Predictability refers to the 
ability to predict the production output of a power plant ahead on time. Storage capacity refers 
to the available technology of storing energy for later use. These factors can contribute to 
supporting system balance by adjusting the production output according to the demand needs. 
Hydropower based production can be regulated up and down. This implies that the large 
production capacity of Norwegian dispatchable hydropower resources can provide the supply 
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mix with flexibility (Energy facts Norway, 2021). On the other hand, integration of wind 
power resources can introduce challenges to system operators due to unpredictable and 
variable nature of it (Ahmed et al., 2020). Same applies for solar based systems, as its 
dependency on weather conditions makes the power output intermittent and difficult to predict 
(Yahyaoui, 2018). The share of solar power that was produced in 2020 in Norway is less than 
1% of the total electricity production, but the installations of new systems are growing at an 
exponential rate (The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2021a). 
In conclusion, the current Norwegian supply mix is flexible enough to respond to changes in 
demand due to the high share of hydropower dispatchable resources. Nevertheless, increased 
share of non- dispatchable resources such as wind and solar based systems in the future can 
make the function of maintaining the system balance more challenging. On the demand side, 
peak loads strain the existing grid capacity. Upgrading the grid for handling peak electricity 
consumption is very costly and could be economically inefficient. This requires finding ways 
of exploiting existing flexibility in the system to reduce the costs that results from system 
imbalance and peak loads.  
 Power System Flexibility  
A resilient electric grid system will have the flexibility to be able to handle problems that arise 
from power imbalance and peak consumption. In the next section, sources of flexibility in the 
production and demand side are going to be discussed. 
Flexibility can be defined as “the ability of a power system to cope with variability and 
uncertainty in both generation and demand, while maintaining a satisfactory level of 
reliability at a reasonable cost, over different time horizons” (Ma et al., 2013, p. 1). From this 
definition, there are two sources of flexibility, which are the generation and demand side. 
2.3.1 Generation Side Flexibility  
Generation side flexibility can be achieved by controlling the amount of production from the 
power plants and/or providing energy storage systems. However, the amount of flexibility that 
the generation side can provide is dependent on some characteristics such as the production 
ramp up/down rate, startup/shut down capability, and generation range (Alizadeh et al., 2016). 
 18
2.3.2 Demand Side Flexibility  
To alleviate system instabilities led by increasing electricity demand and uncertain renewable 
resources, demand side management activities are implemented in order to change the load 
profile of consumers. The load profile describes the variation in customers’ electrical load 
versus a time dimension which could be daily or seasonal. 
 
Flexibility at the consumer side can be manifested into six mechanisms (See Figure 2.3). The 
first is peak clipping which refers to the process of reducing the consumption at specific 
periods without shifting it. The second is valley filling which increases the electric 
consumption at certain periods. The third is load shifting which means the process of moving 
electricity consumption from one time period to another. The fourth is load reduction that 
refers to reducing the total load and the opposite strategy is load growth that increases total 
demand. Finally, flexible load shape when demand is affected only when it is necessary instead 
of permanent basis (Gellings, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Demand side flexibility mechanisms. Inspired by Figure 5 in Jabir 
(2018). From top left to bottom right: a) Peak clipping, b) valley filling, c) load 
shifting, d) load reduction, e) strategic load growth, f) flexible load shape. 
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 Demand Response and Time-of-Use 
Demand side management is generally split into two main fields: Energy efficiency (EE) and 
demand response (DR). EE aims to accomplish the same energy dependent function but by 
using less energy. It is mostly a long-term implementation. Usually, EE actions are 
implemented during the construction of a building and require preliminary investments 
(Alasseri et al., 2017). Two examples are insulation and switching over to LED lights. 
However, the relevant approach for this thesis is DR. It is defined as: 
Changes in electric use by demand-side resources from their normal 
consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity, or to 
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high 
wholesale market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized. (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2020). 
According to Yan et al. (2018), DR can be split into two categories: price-driven demand 
response (PDDR) and “incentive or event-driven demand response”. The latter include direct 
load control, which let the DSO buy flexibility provided by the customers based on market 
mechanism or a contract (Kefayati & Baldick, 2011). For example, in case of low load, and 
high supply, the DSO can activate electric car charging at the customer side. PDDR presents 
consumers with time dependent energy rates. The goal is to shift user’s consumption from 
high priced peak load hours to lower priced off-peak hours. PDDR can be divided further into 




Figure 2.4 - Hierarchical model illustrating TOU’s role in Demand Side 
Management. 
TOU uses static prices that are determined in advance. The prices usually last across several 
hours. A simple example would be dividing the TOU tariff into two blocks: night prices and 
day prices, as this can mirror the load peak hours (IRENA, 2019). It is also possible to divide 
the day into smaller parts, for instance high prices during morning and evenings, while lower 
prices during the off-peak hours in the middle of the day. Seasonality can also play a factor 
when setting TOU prices, such as higher prices during the winter and lower prices during the 
summer. Holidays can also be a component. 
In contrast to the TOU model, which uses static prices for each season, CPP is event driven 
and implements high prices during severely constrained periods in scenarios such as extremely 
cold winters/warm summers. Like in the TOU model, consumers will have an incentive to 
either reduce their energy usage during these peaks or shift consumption to off-peak periods. 
In contrast to TOU, it is not a daily demand response strategy, as serious system constraints 
do not occur daily. Because CPP is event driven, it is not a great tool to reduce daily energy 
consumption or cut energy costs. However, it can (and in certain cases do) complement other 
PDDR models, such as TOU. 
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Traditionally, RTP adapts its prices according to the power system balance or electricity 
whole-price market, however in the DSO’s perspective a better measurement would be to set 
the prices by how much of the grid capacity is expected to be used. There have been limited 
attempts to research the effect of dynamic pricing among residential households, as 
participants will have problems to manually respond accordingly. Hence, it is not yet practical 
to implement RTP. Figure 2.5 illustrates the basic concept of TOU, CPP and RTP. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – Price Driven Demand Response. Inspired by Fig. 2 in Yan et al. (2018): 
From left to right: TOU, CPP and RTP. 
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3. Literature Review 
In this chapter we will review some of the literature that we find most relevant to Elvia’s pilot 
study. We will start by presenting similar pilot studies, which all use TOU except one study 
that use dynamic pricing. Next, we will review studies which use non-monetary interventions 
that can be used to complement TOU tariffs. Thirdly, we discuss how Norwegian consumers 
perceive TOU. 
 Relevant Experiments 
3.1.1 Pilot Study in Norway - Malvik Everk 
In the paper by Sæle & Grande (2011), the authors evaluate the effect of TOU on Norwegian 
households. The article describes defined peak hours that correlate to both high spot prices 
and high load. Hence, consumers have a total price signal that is a combination of the potential 
high spot prices during peak hours and a high network tariff cost. The treatment group consists 
of 40 households in the same geographical area, and they have an above average interest in 
electricity consumption. The peak hour price is set to 7.88 Eurocents/kWh/h in 2010 currency. 
The authors explain that through the experiment, the DSO held two information meetings 
where the customers were notified about features relevant to the pilot study such as price 
signals, load control and peak hours. Furthermore, the participants were informed about 
potential variations in demand and the positive aspects of DR. The DSO’s customers had 
access to a website that showed their network cost with TOU compared to the conventional 
network tariff. 
The study shows that TOU successfully shift load from the morning peak periods, and the 
demand response is even greater for customers with high powered electric boilers used for 
water heating. By generalizing the results for all Norwegian households, they anticipated a 
DR of 1000 MWh/h from Norwegian households in 2010, which was approximately 4.2% of 
the registered peak demand on January 6th, 2010. The customers end up benefiting 
economically.  
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3.1.2 DR in Residential Areas in the Netherlands Caused by Dynamic 
Pricing  
Klaassen et al. (2016) assess a pilot study involving two treatment groups in a newly developed 
residential area in the Netherlands in addition to a control group. The treatment groups involve 
77 and 111 households. As the participants live in the same residential area, the groups are not 
randomized, which might give biased results. The houses in the area are all connected to PV 
panels and a district heating system. This is an interesting addition to the study by Sæle & 
Grande (2011), as it is possible to assess how effective DR is on prosumers.  
In contrast to the pilot study in Norway, which uses high and low prices depending on whether 
it is during peak times or not, this study uses three prices. The customers are presented with a 
dynamic tariff that is communicated a day in advance through a home energy management 
system. They find a 31% significant decrease in load during the evening periods by using a 
two-sample t-test. The load shifts primarily to midday (20% increase), when PV generation is 
at its highest and the dynamic tariff is low. 
The most common appliances used for load shifts are washing machines, tumble dryers and 
dishwashers. Other kitchen appliances, charging appliances and entertainment are not 
commonly used to shift load. Klaassen et al. (2016) classify appliances into time-critical, such 
cooking appliances, and non-time-critical such as washing machines. They conclude that peak 
load reduction is not influenced further by having a higher peak price, as the remaining 
evening peak load is mainly due to strongly time-critical appliances. Hence, complicated 
pricing schemes are not needed, and may confuse the customer. This should be considered 
when designing TOU tariffs.  
3.1.3 Impact of TOU tariffs in Northern Italy 
Torriti (2012) discusses electricity demand and peak shifting in 1446 residential households 
in Northern Italy. The TOU tariffs implemented give the households a lower electricity bill, if 
more than 66 % of their consumption is during low tariff hours. 
The author finds that the consumption during both summer and winter increases on average 
by 13.7% with TOU. Even though consumption on average goes up, the morning peak shifts 
approximately one hour earlier. Also, the height and spikiness of the peak diminishes due to 
 24
TOU. The consumers seem to ignore the TOU tariff in the evenings as the evening peak is still 
present. According to this study, the TOU’s ability to achieve DR is questionable as a majority 
of the substations face a higher electricity demand. 
According to Torriti, the lack of load reduction may be an indication of the inflexible nature 
of certain activities, which are determined by the timing of human behavior rather than price. 
He questions the usefulness of TOU because it fails to reduce the peak loads and suggests 
investing into alternative programs such as real time pricing. He also points out that the 
information to the customers about TOU was lackluster. 
3.1.4 Introducing TOU in Sweden 
Bartusch et al (2011) completed a study in collaboration with a DSO in Central-Sweden to 
investigate Swedish households’ response to a TOU tariff. The customers of the DSO without 
TOU have network tariffs with a high variable price and without any fixed tariff component. 
The treatment group which consists of 500 customers is introduced to TOU where the fee for 
using electricity during off peak hours is zero. The peak hour ratings are determined by fuse 
size and by the average of the 5 highest meter readings during peak hours. The defined peak 
hours are between 07:00 - 19:00.  The rates are higher during winter compared to summer. 
The analysis consists of the one-year period prior to the TOU implementation and the two 
years following. 
The Swedish electricity market is similar to the Norwegian, as both countries experience cold 
and dark winters, which results in energy consumption for heating and light sources. The 
authors find that total consumption is reduced by 11.1% the first year and 14.2% the second 
year. Furthermore, consumption shifts from peak hours to off-peak hours by approximately 
1%. Most households experience lower expenses with TOU. 
3.1.5 The Effect of Information on TOU: An Irish Residential Study 
Pon (2017) argues that increased information from in-home display (IHD) may let consumers 
learn how their energy habits influence their bill. This can promote energy conservation 
behavior. In his study, Pon looks into how real time usage information and more often billing 
practices affect residential electricity consumption in a TOU setting. The treatment groups are 
as follows: Firstly, households with bi-monthly billing + energy reports. Secondly, households 
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with monthly billing + energy reports. Thirdly, households with IHD + bi-monthly billing + 
energy reports. The energy reports include details about the households’ electricity usage and 
tips on how to reduce energy consumption. The control group receives bi-monthly billing and 
does not have energy reports and TOU. The treatment group consists of 2400 participants. 
The households with TOU pricing and bi-monthly bills reduce their peak usage by 4.9%. 
Monthly billing results in an average reduction up to 5.5%. Households with IHD reduce their 
consumption up to 8.9%. Pon argues that the results indicate that if households have more 
access to information concerning their consumption, they will proportionally reduce their 
consumption. He states that “energy bills and reports may act as reminders for households to 
be more aware of their usage and conserve energy” (Pon, 2017, p. 68). More frequent billing 
and energy reports will thus remind the users to conserve energy during peak hours. 
The households with an IHD and bi-monthly billing initially decreased their peak consumption 
more than the treatment groups that did not have IHD. These reductions would however start 
declining until the effects were similar to those with monthly billing and without IHD. This 
suggests that the effects of IHD are not permanent and will slowly fade away. 
This study makes it clear that giving the households information- and reminders about their 
energy usage is important to achieve reduced load during peak hours. Thus, TOU tariffs need 
to be implemented in combination with increased information to have optimal effect.  
 Intervention Studies on Energy Conservation 
Abrahamse et al (2005) reviewed various published articles within social- and environmental 
psychology. The goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions with the intention to 
persuade households to reduce their energy use. These articles do not focus on load shift, but 
rather on a general reduction. However, the strategies implemented may still be relevant to 
achieve both load shift and to reduce consumption during high peak hours. In this section we 
present the most relevant interventions. 
The interventions can broadly be categorized as either antecedent interventions or 
consequence interventions. Antecedent interventions are assumed to impact the consumer 
before behavior performances take place. An example is that providing information on how to 
reduce energy consumption may reduce consumption due to attained knowledge. The other 
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category is known as consequence interventions. These strategies assume that encouraging or 
discouraging consequences impact consumers’ behavior. For instance, positive feedback can 
let the consumer see that he or she is able to reduce consumption successfully, which can 
motivate this behavior further. While an increase in energy consumption will be less appealing 
if there are negative consequences. 
Goal setting is a form of antecedent intervention which involves introducing a household to a 
reference point, for instance reducing energy by 10%. It is advantageous if goal setting is 
combined with other interventions, such as feedback, to let households know how they are 
doing regarding the goal. An example of how this can be accomplished is by applying what 
McCalley & Midden (2002) did in a laboratory setting. They introduced goal setting and 
feedback to a single energy-related behavior, which was doing laundry. Participants that were 
given a goal in addition to feedback saved more energy per wash compared to those who just 
received feedback. A tough goal, like 20%, gives higher consumption reduction (15.1%) 
compared to an easily optionable goal like 2%, which shows almost no effect (Becker, 1978). 
Information is a widely used intervention strategy that aims to encourage reduction in energy 
consumption. It can be broad information about energy-related problems, such as grid 
capacity, or more detailed information like methods on how to save energy. A workshop is an 
example of information intervention. Geller (1981) performed a study to assess how successful 
workshops are. The attendees also received a booklet that had information on how to reduce 
energy consumption. This is closely related to the information meetings performed by Malvik 
Everk in Sæle & Grande’s study (2011). However, Geller (1981) did not find any behavioral 
changes regarding energy use. Mass media campaign can also be used to increase information 
about energy reduction to consumers. Staats et al. (1996) finds that mass media campaigns 
give a slight increase in knowledge, but no evidence of reduced energy usage. 
Feedback is a commonly used consequence intervention that gives households information 
about their energy use. It can be divided into the frequency of the feedback. Abrahamse et al. 
(2005) divides feedback into continuous feedback, daily feedback, weekly/monthly feedback, 
and comparative feedback.  
Continuous feedback may be given with the help of a monitor, such as an IHD, that shows 
households their energy consumption. Monthly feedback can also be given through the 
electricity bill. Heberlein & Warriner (1983) did a study focusing on the difference between 
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high peak and low peak hours, in which the latter had a lower rate. The customers received 
feedback via their electricity bill on how much kWh they consumed during high peak hours 
and off-peak hours. The results show that higher price disparities increase load shifts, however 
commitment and knowledge have greater impact.  
Comparative feedback is the assumption that feedback about the household’s relative 
consumption compared to others can help reduce energy use. This can lead to a sense of 
competition and social pressure which can be an effective way to achieve load shifts. Ayres et 
al. (2009) analyze the effect from the SMUD experiment, where the treatment group receives 
energy reports with 4 personalized elements. (1) A bar graph comparing their own 
consumption in the current period against similar neighbors and more efficient neighbors. (2) 
The same comparison, but over the last 12 months. (3) A segment that compares the 
consumption of the household in the months of the current year to the months of the year 
before. (4) Energy saving advice based on the household’s consumption pattern. They find 
this intervention results in a 2.1% decrease in consumption, which does not diminish over the 
12 months the experiment is active. 
Petkov et al. (2011) dive into the effectiveness of social comparison by introducing an 
application that lets users use 5 features such as live data, history, neighbors, challenge and 
ranking. They authors find that peers are appropriate for comparison for motivating 
competition, while others are great for benchmarking.  
 Customer perception 
A potential problem with implementing a TOU tariff model is the risk of having customers 
feeling repugnant by higher prices during their preferred time of consumption. In 2015, The 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate asked Trøndelag Forskning og Utvikling 
to perform a consumer survey with the goal of getting a better understanding of consumers’ 
perception of potential changes in the network tariff (Naper et al., 2016). The survey was 
performed on focus groups which consisted of ordinary households and customers with cabins. 
The groups were asked to compare and state their opinions on four tariff models outlined by 
The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, one of them being a TOU model. 
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During the interviews it became clear that the participants in general had problems 
contemplating network tariffs without also including electricity prices. The participants also 
had problems understanding electric power as a concept and how to take the grid's capacity 
into consideration. 
The response throughout all the groups was that it was intuitively easy to understand TOU as 
a concept. In many groups it was compared to “rush hour” fares used in larger cities in Norway. 
Interestingly, this comparison was not used for the other 3 tariff models even though this logic 
would fit all the models. This might imply that TOU is a great model to let consumers 
understand the economic benefits of transferring load from high peak hours to low peak hours. 
Even though the participants understood the concepts of TOU easily, the participants felt the 
TOU model was the most unfair and would punish those with the least flexibility. In short, 
many felt like they would get punished for consuming electricity during high peak hours rather 
than being rewarded for consuming in low-peak hours. People seem to anticipate that they 
would get worse off by having their network tariff changed to TOU, even though this would 
not be necessarily true.  
 Conclusions From the Literature Review 
Some of the studies have problems with small sample sizes and selection bias. For instance, 
Klaassen et al. (2016) and Grande & Sæle (2011) have problems with both, while other studies 
have dealt with this problem sufficiently through random sampling and random assignment. 
Also, some of the studies might not be directly comparable to the Norwegian electricity 
market. 
 
Another problem is that most of the studies are approximately 10 years old at this point. This 
is not necessarily a problem, however, there has been a substantial shift in the energy sector, 
especially in Norway. As mentioned earlier, EVs are getting more popular every year, smart 
home systems and smart grids are becoming more common, and power generation is shifting 
towards less predictable sources. A new pilot study in Norway will give insights whether TOU 
is more relevant today. 
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The reviewed studies in this thesis have set the TOU/dynamic tariffs in such a way that the 
average customer will pay the same as- or less than before. The result is often that the 
consumer ends up paying less. Most studies are active for 1-2 years. The TOU tariffs, and 
therefore also the results, are divided into summer months and winter months. This is due to 
the seasonality in the electricity consumption, as consumption increases due to heating 
appliances during the winter in colder countries. The peak hour prices under a TOU tariff are 
thus higher during winter as the network capacity is more constrained.  
 
Different methods are used to assess consumption reduction. One common method is by 
comparing means. For instance, by comparing the difference in mean of the control group 
between two years and the difference in mean between two years for the treatment group. 
Another method is by using interpolation of the consumption plots and then comparing the 
area under the graphs (Torriti, 2012). Torriti also includes temperature changes as a control 
variable, which is a great addition.  
 
The results vary across different studies. Some report lower morning peaks, while some report 
lower evening peaks. Torriti also finds that the evening peak simply just shifts to the moment 
the high peak prices stop.  
 
Lastly, interventions such as feedback seem to have a greater impact on load shifting than the 
high peak prices by themselves. However, IHD seems to save less money than simpler means 
such as more frequent electricity bills. The pilot study in the Netherlands finds that more 




4. Experimental Design 
The aim of the study is to determine if TOU will have an effect on consumption, and how four 
different communication strategies used to inform the customers about the TOU tariff can 
motivate them to respond to the assigned tariff model. 
 
The study can be characterized as a randomized field experiment. A sensible discussion of an 
experiment requires an understanding of key concepts and terminologies.  
 
In experiments, a treatment is something that researchers manipulate to a group of participants 
in order to study its effect so a causal relationship can be established. In the context of this 
study, treatments are the mix of tariff models and communication strategies.  
 
Participants who have been exposed to the treatment are called the experimental group. 
Another group of participants called a controlled group, who are participants that don't receive 
any treatment. 
 
Randomization refers to the random assignment of participants to the control and treatment 
groups. Thus, a participant has an equal chance of being part of any group. The random 
assignment of the participants helps to avoid selection bias as there will be no reason to expect 
that one group would have an advantage over the other (Heckman et al., 1998). This 
consequently means, in case of absence of the treatment, the outcomes of the control group’s 
participants would not differ systematically from what the outcomes of the experimental 
group’s participants would have been. In other words, observed and unobserved factors are 
likely to affect both groups equally.  By comparing the outcomes of both groups after running 
the experiment, any difference would be attributed solely to the effect of the treatment. 
 
Field refers to experiments that have been done in a real-world setting. This is contrary to the 
lab setting where participants are always alerted that they are part of an experiment so their 
attitude might be different to what would have been in real life. The ability to generalize the 
results is usually higher in the field experiments. However, this comes at the expense of losing 
control over all the variables that can affect experiments’ participants. Therefore, high degree 
of control in lab experiments allow for stronger claim of causality. Nevertheless, a well-
designed field experiment can neutralize the effect of external forces (Roe & Just, 2009).  
 31 
 The Electricity Invoice  
It is worth noting that the grid tariff is considered as only one part of the electricity bill that a 
typical Norwegian electricity customer gets each month. The electricity bill can be classified 
into three components (Eriksen & Mook, 2020): 
 
 Grid (Network) tariff covers the costs entailed by grid operators for transferring the 
electricity from the production sites to the customers. The grid costs have a high share 
of fixed “investment” costs and a low share of variable costs. The amount of revenue 
that a grid operator can obtain from grid users is strictly regulated by the authorities. 
 
 Electricity price:  represents the amount of consumed electricity provided by an 
electricity provider company that a customer can choose. A consumer pays the market 
price plus a commission for the service provider.  The market price of electricity 
reflects the supply and demand of electricity per hour per region.  
 
 Expenses and taxes: these mainly are governmental funds expenses and added value 
taxes. 
 
Usually, each part makes up a third of the total electricity bill paid by the customer, however, 
in case of cheap electricity prices, this part becomes less than the third, and when it is 
expensive, it becomes more than the third.  
 
The structure of electricity bill demonstrates that the grid tariff is not the only factor that affects 
consumers’ payment, so approaching customers to change their consumption pattern by 
appealing only to their economic sense may not be enough. The structure of the electricity bill 
among households in different countries in Europe can be seen in Figure 4.1. Households in 





Figure 4.1 - EU Households electricity bills by components in 2017 (source: 
European Commission, ‘Energy prices and costs in Europe’, 2019) 
 
 Design  
4.2.1 Sample Size  
The experiment consists mainly of two groups: an experimental group and control group. The 
experimental group consists of 4 subgroups, as there is a distinct communication strategy for 
each subgroup. 1250 participants were randomly assigned for each sub-group. Practical issues 
have been taken into consideration in order to decide this number of participants by Elvia.  
 
The database that has the experiment participants' data, also contains data for 8000 customers’ 
IDs which were randomly assigned to serve as a control group. However, handling all the data 
for 8000 control group customers, plus the treatment groups, is computationally expensive and 
limits our abilities of processing the data within our current computational capabilities. 
Therefore, we have determined an appropriate size of the control group that allows for smooth 
computational operations and does not undermine the scientific merit of the study. According 
to Duflo et al. (2007), when more than one treatment is considered and the focus of the study 
is on the contrast between the control group and each treatment group, twice as many 
participants in the control than in each treatment group would be considered as optimal 
allocation. Therefore, in this study context, the data of 2500 customers are used as a control 
group, which have been randomly drawn from the original 8000. 
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4.2.2 Participants  
Participants in each sub experimental group were randomly drawn and assigned from the total 
population of Elvia’s residential customers. They have been informed through a post mail that 
they are part of an experiment. They had the option to opt out from the experimental tariff 
model by calling Elvia's customer service line and asking for it. Some customers choose to do 
that. When participants opt out from an experiment, this is known as attrition. A high attrition 
rate can pose problems when the goal is randomized trials. This is because the goal of 
randomization is to compare similar groups, but when participants choose to leave, the groups 
can become unbalanced. Thus, it is important to check the attrition rate. We will go more in 
depth about this problem in the discussion part. The numbers of customers who chose to 
remain in each sub-group are as follows can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
Subgroup Remaining customers Designed size Attrition rate 
INGEN 1113 1250 11% 
KONKURRANSE 1093 1250 12.5% 
MILJO 1125 1250 10% 
SMART 1174 1250 6% 
Table 1 - Attrition Rate: Control group did not receive any treatment; therefore, 








 Treatments  
4.3.1 The Tariff Model 
Dag & Natt 
The relevant TOU tariff for this thesis is called “Dag & Natt”, which translates to “Day & 
Night”. Throughout the year, it is more expensive to use electricity during the day (06 - 22), 
than at night (22 - 06). In addition, the year is divided into two parts, summer, and winter. 
There is also a distinction between weekdays and weekends. The night tariff is applied at all 
hours on weekends (Saturday and Sunday) and on public holidays. Table 2 shows the network 




Item  Summer months Winter Months 
Variable part, Dag time (06:00 – 22:00) 28,35 øre/kWh 63,10 øre/kWh 
Variable part, weekends and Natt time 
(22:00 – 06:00) 
25,85 øre/kWh 28,35 øre/kWh 
Fixed part 
 Innlandet area 








Table 2 - TOU Tariffs Implemented by Elvia. Summer is from April to October. 
Winter is from November to March. 
 





Innlandet 370.83 kr/month 30.86 øre/kWh 27.11 øre/kWh 
Oslo 115 kr/ month 44.80 øre/kWh 44.80 øre/kWh 
Table 3 - Network Tariffs for the Control Group 
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 Communicating TOU to the Customers 
To achieve a successful DR, it is important that the customers in the treatment groups are 
informed about the introduction of TOU. All the 4 different treatment groups in Dag & Natt 
received the same introduction letter through postal mail. In addition, the participants receive 
differently formulated emails depending on which treatment group they are assigned to. These 
emails are sent sporadically, usually every 3-5 weeks. 
 
In the introduction letter, Elvia tries to explain to the participants why they have been invited 
to the pilot study (See Appendix A1). It mostly refers to the limitations of the grid's capacity 
and that by utilizing the current grid more efficiently it is possible to prevent expanding the 
grid's capacity. Next, the introduction letter explains the basic concepts of the pricing model: 
It is less expensive to use electricity between 22:00 and 06:00. Furthermore, the letter shows 
the new prices and compares them to the prices prior to treatment. Lastly, the letter explains 
the span of the pilot study, and that they will receive email throughout the study with 
information and advice on how to reduce consumption.  
 
The 4 different communication strategies each send emails to the participants at the same time. 
The aim of the different communication strategies is to define the best way to communicate 
the different tariff models to the customers and motivate them to change their consumption 
pattern accordingly. The content of the emails in the communication strategies are somewhat 
similar, but there are small nuances in the formulations that set them apart. All the emails also 
contain links to a website that include advice on how to reduce consumption. The participants 
in a communication strategy that own an EV receives an email that also focuses on EV as a 
tool to DR. The 4 communication (illustrated in Figure 4.2) strategies are:  
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Figure 4.2 - An overview of the groups used in this study. 
 
4.4.1 Neutral (INGEN) 
The neutral communication strategy is sent to the treatment group known as INGEN (See 
Appendix A2). The focus of this communication strategy is simply to inform the customer 
about the current state of the pilot study and in the near future. For instance, during the winter, 
the emails inform the customers that this is the best time to save money as the price difference 
between day and night is larger compared to the summer.  
4.4.2 Competitive (KONKURRANSE)   
The aim of this communication strategy is to appeal to the customers’ competitive instinct 
(See Appendix A3). For instance, some headlines refer to “you got more control” and “you 
will have the cheapest network tariff”. The emails also include statements about having 
“cheaper network tariffs compared to your neighbors”.  
4.4.3 Smart Consumption (SMART) 
The smart communication strategy focuses on the economic aspects of the new tariff, such as 
price and saving money (See Appendix A4). For instance, one headline is formulated as “We 
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have reduced the prices so you can save money” and “The better you understand your invoice, 
the more money you can save”. 
4.4.4 Environment (MILJO) 
This communication strategy aims to persuade the customer to change behavior by appealing 
to the environmental aspects of energy reduction (See Appendix A5). The content as 
mentioned earlier is mostly the same as the neutral communication strategy, however certain 
formulations such as the title is slightly different. The first email for instance includes “Now 
it will become cheaper to think green” and “Using electricity smartly also protects the 
environment” in the title.  
 Research Question 
What is the causal interaction effect of the TOU and the four different communication 
strategies on customers’ electricity consumption? 
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5. Statisitcal Analysis 
 Data Description and Data Quality 
The raw data are smart meter readings values for each participant customer for each hour. The 
unit for measurement consumption is kilowatt-hour per hour (kWh/h). The meter readings 
cover 4 months as a control period (Nov 2019, Dec 2019, Jan 2020, Feb 2020) and 4 months 
when the tested tariff model came into effect (Nov 2020, Dec 2020, Jan 2021, Feb 2021). 
 
There were some missing observations. A check has been done to find if there are any 
systematic trends in the missing values that could bias the analysis. It showed that these 
missing values are distributed equally among different groups, months, days and hours. The 
missing observations represented less than .5 % from the total number of observations. These 
observations were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Regarding outliers, values that have been judged to represent a natural true consumption have 
been kept, while unrealistic values that are considered as a registration error (> 1000 kWh/h) 
have been removed from the analysis. 
 
In order to control for the effect of temperature, the data for the minimum temperature degree 
per day have been downloaded from Norsk klimaservicesenter (2021) for the required months. 
 Descriptive analysis and pre experiment analysis  
The aim of this section is to find if the control group and experimental groups are in the same 
baseline before starting the experiment. Therefore, this analysis covers only the pre-
experiment period. 
 
Table 4 demonstrates summary statistics for aggregated daily consumption per customer 
segmented into group types. The mean is greater than median across all the groups which 













INGEN 54.7 48.4 38.1 132055 398 
KONKURRANSE 54.1 46.9 37.5 130077 307 
MILJO 52.9 46.4 38.2 132655 384 
SMART 58.1 52 39.5 139373 364 
CONTROL 52.6 47.2 35.8 296816 437 
Table 4 - Daily Consumption Prior to Experiment. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of aggregated daily consumption in kWh for each consumer 




Figure 5.1 - Boxplot of the Groups in the Study. The boxplot shows that groups have 
relatively similar distributions with many outliers.  
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5.2.1 Differences between groups 
To capture differences between the groups, a regression model has been built in the form of 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑑 = α + 𝛽1𝐺1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺3𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐺4𝑖 + λ0𝑀𝑑 + λ1𝑊𝑑 + λ2𝑇𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑 
 
where  
 𝑌𝑖𝑑   is the outcome of daily consumption for consumer i in day d. 
 𝐺1𝑖: group INGEN membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 otherwise. 
 𝐺2𝑖: group SMART membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 otherwise. 
 𝐺3𝑖: group KONKURRANSE membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 
otherwise. 
 𝐺4𝑖: group MILJO membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 otherwise. 
 𝑀𝑑: Categorical variable characterizes which month that day d belongs to (2019-11 
(reference), 2019-12, 2020-01, 2020-02). 
 𝑊𝑑: Categorical variable characterizes which weekday that day d is (Friday is 
reference). 
 𝑇𝑑: Minimum temperature registered at day d. 
 α is the intercept. 
 𝛽𝑗 is the difference in consumption between the control group and each treatment 
group Gj. 
 λ0, λ1, λ2 are control variables’ coefficient  
 𝜀𝑖𝑑  is the error term. 
 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. To check the model with different 























































*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 5 - Differences Between Groups Prior to the Experiment 
 
Despite the random assignment of consumers into different groups, the regression 
models show that there are statistically significant differences between the treatment groups 
and control groups in terms of the daily consumption during the pre-experiment periods. Some 
 42
differences are relatively small in magnitude such as MILJO and KONKURRANSE while 
SMART and INGEN have relatively bigger differences in comparison to the control group. It 
is worth mentioning that due to large sample size, small differences can be detected as 
statistically significant (Lantz, 2012).  
 Differene-in-Differences 
The goal of this study is not only to determine if there is a statistical difference between the 
control and treatment groups, but also quantifying the differences, if there are any. The reason 
for that is to find if the magnitude of differences can be practically beneficial. Having a 
statistical significance implies that there is a high likelihood that the detected effect is due to 
the treatment and not chance. However, an effect can be statistically significant but not 
necessarily beneficial practically. On the other hand, if an effect is not statistically significant, 
then its practical significance cannot be judged. Therefore, a statistically significant effect is a 
necessary prerequisite for estimating the actual practical significance. 
A tool that can help finding both statistical and practical significance is Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. This can be assessed by regressing the consumption on the different groups 
and estimating the coefficient of each treatment group in relation to the control group.  
With the current experimental design, an OLS regression using the experiment data, would be 
sufficient to find the differences between the control and treatment groups after starting the 
experiment, only in the case if there were no detected statistical differences between the groups 
before running the experiment. In that case, the groups would have the same baseline.  
However, as it has been shown in the pre-experiment analysis section, there are detected 
differences even if they are small. Using a simple OLS model in this case can introduce a bias, 
as the model can attribute the differences that already exist between the groups before the 
experiment, to the treatments’ effects, which is the so-called omitted-variable bias. Therefore, 
an alternative method must be used to control for these pre-experiment differences. This can 
be done by using the Difference-in-Difference estimator.  
5.3.1 Why use Difference-in-differences? 
Our goal is to determine the causal effect of TOU on electricity consumption. The problem is 
that one cannot observe the same individual both taking- and not taking the treatment at the 
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same time. One could start by comparing individuals that are introduced to TOU against those 
who are not. However, a difference between the group means often indicates selection effects, 
which is the average causal effect on the treated + selection bias (Angrist & Pischke 2014). 
Regression can make comparisons between a treatment variable D against an outcome Y. In 
this case Y would be consumption, while D is 1 if the individual has a TOU tariff, while X is 
a vector of covariates. To make sure that the comparison is as close as possible, such that one 
can obtain the causal effect, one has to control for certain variables. However, it is not feasible 
to obtain such variables on an individual level in this experiment. If it is not possible to control 
sufficiently, there is a risk of omitted variable bias.  
The problem in this study is that there is a statistical difference of the mean between the groups. 
We do not have access to every variable that may impact the difference between the groups. 
It may not even be feasible to obtain these. One reason being that the groups are quite large, 
another reason is that participants can be reluctant to give up necessary information. Instead, 
an alternative approach will be used in the analysis. 
One method that can deal with this problem is difference-in-differences (DID), which is based 
on the concept that by comparing the groups’ changes in consumption before treatment and 
after the initiation of treatment, one should get the treatment effect (Angrist & Pischke 2014).  
An advantage of DID is that it takes into account whether there is already a difference between 
the groups. It is also able to take into account certain changes that are not due to the treatment. 
A common problem with DID is the lack of observation before and after the treatment, which 
is important when determining the parallel trend assumption. As this study has sufficient data, 





Figure 5.2 - Illustration of the DID concept. The counterfactual moves in parallel 
with the control group. The difference between the observed consumption and the 
counterfactual is the treatment effect. (Inspired by Figure 5.1 in Angrist & Pischke 
(2014). 
5.3.2 DID Regression 
Consider the basic DID regression with a control group and a single treatment group: 
 
 




 𝑌𝑖𝑑 is the consumption of consumer i in kWh on day d. 
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable which is 1 if consumer i received treatment, 0 if 
not.  
 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑 is a dummy variable which is 1 if day d is after the treatment has been 
implemented. 
 α is the intercept and which is equal to the average consumption in the control group 
prior to treatment. 
 𝛽 is the difference between the control group and the treatment group before 
treatment. 
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 δ is the coefficient of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑) and is the causal 
effect of interest. 
 γ is the time trend of the control group. 
 𝑿𝑖𝑑 represent a vector of control variables. 
5.3.3 Assumptions 
DID can be used to determine causal effects from observational data as long as its assumption 
criteria are met. The assumption for OLS is also relevant for DID regression. However, Angrist 
& Pischke (2014) points out that additionally a DID regression requires a common trends 
assumption. It is based on the assumption that the TOU tariff is the only thing that happens in 
the treatment period that may impact a difference between the treatment and control groups. 
This implies that the trends of the control group and the treatment group will move in parallel 
with each other in the case of the absence of the treatment. Since customers are randomly 
assigned to either control or experimental groups, this implies that there would be no potential 
reason that they will have no parallel trend in the absence of the treatment. Also, Figure 5.3 - 
The registered average hourly weekday consumption per group before treatment is initiated. 




Figure 5.3 - The registered average hourly weekday consumption per group before 
treatment is initiated. 
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 How Should the Results in the Analysis Be Interpreted 
A common problem in research within social sciences are non-compliance problems, where 
some of the research subjects do not take the treatment when assigned to the treatment. To 
account for this, we must know how the results from the analysis should be interpreted. In 
treatment studies such as in this thesis, compliers are those who take treatment when 
(randomly) offered treatment, but do not take treatment if they are not offered treatment 
(Angrist & Pischke 2014). The compliers are usually the type of customers we are interested 
in, as they comply with treatment assignments.  
Non-compliers can be divided into 3 different groups: Never takers, always-takers and defiers. 
Never-takers never receive treatment even though they are assigned to the treatment group. 
Always-takers will always take treatment, even if they are assigned to the control group, but 
in this study Always-takers will not be able to take treatment if assigned to control. Defiers 
are the test subjects that take the opposite of what their treatment assignment suggests. 
However, defiers are rare or even non-existent, thus one can safely assume that there are no 
defiers in the study. This assumption is called monotonicity (Angrist & Pischke 2014).  
 
 Assigned to treatment Assigned to control 
Compliers Treated Not treated 
Always-Takers Treated Treated 
Never-Takers Not treated Not Treated 
Defiers Not Treated Treated 
Table 6 - Compliance Matrix. Participants are classified into never-takers, defiers 
and always-takers, which are non-compliers, and into compliers. The matrix is 
divided into those who are assigned to TOU and control group, and whether they 
take the treatment or not 
 
By taking the compliance matrix into account, it is not necessarily intuitive what the causal 
effect retrieved from the TOU actually represents. The results may for instance be the causal 
effect of both compliers and all non-compliers, or maybe the causal effect on just compliers 
and always takers. Angrist & Pischke (2014) mention different measures to compare 
treatments. 
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Average treatment effect (ATE) is the weighted average of treatment on never-takers, always-
takers, and compliers, with the assumption of no defiers. It can be understood as the average 
causal effect of a population. It is the effect of treatment on a randomly selected person. 
Treatment on treated effect (TOT) is the average causal effect of those who actually take 
treatment and is a weighted average effect on always takers and compliers. 
Intention-to-treat (ITT) effect captures the causal effects on those who are being 
offered/assigned to treatment but does not take non-compliance into consideration. 
Local average treatment effect (LATE) is the treatment effect just on compliers. LATE is the 
ATE but only on compliers. 
Because the treatment population includes always-takers and because there is no way to tell 
them apart from compliers in this study, the LATE cannot be obtained by using DID. Hence, 
the LATE measurement can safely be excluded. The ITT includes never-takers. These are 
removed from the data when opting out, which means never-takers are not included in the 
analysis. Thus, the ITT measurement is not relevant in this pilot study. Removing never-takers 
from the analysis can be justified, because if TOU tariffs are implemented in the future, no 
one would have the choice to opt-out. This logic also applies for the ATE measurement. This 
leaves TOT, which measures the effect of TOU on compliers and always takers. It is important 
to take notice of this, as this is relevant in the context of interpreting the results later. The 
treatment effect can be interpreted as “What is the causal effect of TOU on those who are 
offered TOU and also use TOU”. 
 Modelling & Results 
5.5.1 Model A: Dag Hours 
Model A aims to test if the higher electricity price during the Dag hours has an effect on the 
electricity consumption for consumers during these hours across different communication 
strategies. The DID model is as follows: 
 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑑 = α + γ𝑇𝑑 + β1𝐺1𝑖 + β2𝐺2𝑖 + β3𝐺3𝑖 + β4𝐺4𝑖 + δ1𝐺1𝑖𝑇𝑑 + δ2𝐺2𝑖𝑇𝑑 + δ3𝐺3𝑖𝑇𝑑
+ δ4𝐺4𝑖𝑇𝑑 + λ0𝑊𝑑 + λ1𝑃𝑑 + ε𝑖𝑑 
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Where: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑑   is the outcome of aggregated consumption of Dag hours for consumer i in day d 
in kWh. 
 𝑇𝑑   is a dummy variable which is 1 if day d is when the experiment is running, 0 
otherwise. In other words, it is coded 1 if day d is in the months (Nov 2020, Dec 
2020, Jan 2021, Feb 2021) and zero if it is in (Nov 2019, Dec 2019, Jan 2020, Feb 
2020). 
 𝐺1𝑖: Group INGEN membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 
otherwise. 
 𝐺2𝑖: Group SMART membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 
otherwise. 
 𝐺3𝑖: Group KONKURRANSE membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 
0 otherwise. 
 𝐺4𝑖: Group MILJO membership is coded as 1 if consumer i belongs to it, 0 
otherwise. 
 𝐺1𝑖𝑇𝑑: interaction between INGEN membership and when it is applied (treatment 
effect). 
 𝐺2𝑖𝑇𝑑: interaction between SMART membership and when it is applied (treatment 
effect). 
 𝐺3𝑖𝑇𝑑: interaction between KONKURRANSE membership and when it is applied 
(treatment effect). 
 𝐺4𝑖𝑇𝑑: interaction between MILJO membership and when it is applied (treatment 
effect). 
 𝑊𝑑: Categorical variable characterizes which weekday that day d is (Friday is 
reference). On weekends, Natt tariff is the only one applied, thus, Saturday and 
Sunday are not included in this model. 
 𝑃𝑑: Minimum temperature registered at day d. 
 γ is the time trend of the control group. 
 β𝑗 is the difference in consumption between treatment group Gj and the control 
group. 
 δj is the interaction causal effect. 
 λ0, λ1are the covariates’ coefficients 
 𝜀𝑖𝑑 is the error term 
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The results in Table 7 show that the four treatment effects have negative signs which indicate 
reduction in consumption. However, only the effects of KONKURRANSE and MILJO are 
statistically significant. The former group managed to reduce the consumption of Dag hours 
by .57 kWh on average per person, while the latter group managed to reduce the consumption 
of Dag hours by .64 kWh on average per person. Different versions of the model with different 



















Coefficient Model A: Dag 
(Intercept) 35.29*** 
(0.08) 
post 2.41***  
(0.08) 
INGEN 1.46***  
(0.11) 


























*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 7 - The Regression Estimates of Model A: Dag 
Residuals Analysis  
In order to check for OLS assumptions, residuals density plot has been plotted to check 
residuals distribution. The plot shows that the residuals have a Right-skewed distribution with 
a long right tail. This is in line with the distribution of consumption observations. Therefore, 
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the long right tail of residuals is mostly due to outliers which have been detected earlier in the 
boxplot graph in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 - Residual plot 
Figure 5.4 shows a violation of residuals normality however, according to the Central Limit 
Theorem the estimators should be normally distributed because of the large sample size being 
used in this study, even though the error term is not. To confirm this assumption, we checked 
whether the estimators are biased using bootstrapping (based on 1000 replications). The results 
in Appendix B3 shows that the bias is relatively insignificant. 
5.5.2 Month vs Month  
In order to test if the treatment effect is constant across all months or there are some trends 
such as increased or reduced effects as months go by. A model has been built for each month. 
The models follow the exact same form of the previous model except that the models cover 
one month as an experimental period and one month as a reference period. A complete table 
of the models’ estimates can be found in Appendix B4. Table 8 - The Causal Effect for Each 




Nov 2019 vs 
Nov 2020 
Dec 2019 vs 
Dec 2020 
Jan 2020 vs 
Jan 2021 















































N 284475 312997 305920 278508 
R-Squared 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
Table 8 - The Causal Effect for Each Month 
The results show that treatments effects vary across the months with no specific trend can be 
detected.  
5.5.3 Model B: NATT Weekday  
In order to test if the decreased consumption is a result of a shift in the consumption from 
DAG hours to Natt hours or simply a reduction without shifting, a model has been built to see 
the effect of treatments on Natt consumption during weekdays only. The model follows the 
same form of Model A except that it estimates aggregated consumption for Natt hours. 
Therefore,  𝑌𝑖𝑑   is the outcome of aggregated consumption of Natt hours for consumer i in day 
d. A complete table of the model’s estimates can be found in Appendix B5. Table 9 reports 






Model B: Natt 
Weekday 
(Intercept) 15.37 *** 
(0.04) 










*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 9 - Estimated Causal Effect During Natt Hours (Weekday). 
The results show that the KONKURRANSE and MILJO treatment effects have negative signs 
which indicate reduction in consumption. However, only the effect of KONKURRANSE is 
statistically significant at the .05 level. These results indicate that the decreased consumption 
during Dag hours is a result of a general reduction in electricity consumption behavior that 
applies for both Dag and Natt hours, and not a result of shifting of consumption. On the other 
hand, INGEN group has a statistically significant increase in consumption. 
5.5.4 Model C: NATT Weekend  
In order to test if the same results of weekdays apply also for weekends, a model has been 
built to see the effect of treatments on daily consumption during weekends only. The model 
follows the same form of Model A except that it estimates aggregated daily consumption and 
covers only weekend days. Therefore,  𝑌𝑖𝑑   is the outcome of aggregated daily consumption for 
consumer i in day d and 𝑊𝑑   Categorical variable characterizes which weekend day that day d 
is (Saturday is reference).  A complete table of the model’s estimates can be found in Appendix 
























*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 10 - Estimated Causal Effect on Weekends. 
 
The results indicate no statistically significant results of treatment at the .05 level across all 
the groups. However, it follows the Dag hours pattern in terms of the sign direction, which is 
that KONKURRANSE and MILJO have negative signs, while SMART and INGEN have 
positive signs. 
5.5.5 Model D: Total  
In order to confirm the insight from the previous models which is that the KONKURRANSE 
and MILJO strategies have an effect on making consumers reduce their consumption in 
general, while INGEN and SMART showed no effect. A model has been built to see the effect 
of treatments on daily consumption. The model follows the same form of Model A except that 
it estimates aggregated daily consumption and covers both weekends and weekdays. 
Therefore, 𝑌𝑖𝑑   is the outcome of aggregated daily consumption for consumer i in day d and 
𝑊𝑑    Categorical variable characterizes which weekend day that day d is (Friday is 
reference).  A complete table of the model’s estimates can be found in Appendix B7. Table 11 
reports interaction effects estimates and the intercept. 
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*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 11 - Estimated Causal Effect of the Aggregated daily Consumption Across 
the Whole Experiment. 
 
KONKURRANSE and MILJO treatment effects are statistically significant with negative 
signs while INGEN and SMART have positive signs but show no statistical significance. 
That confirms the insight from previous models. In general, KONKURRANSE and MILJO 
reduce their consumption, while INGEN and SMART show no statistical difference in 
consumption in relation to the control group. 
 Summary of the Results  
In order to give better understanding of the magnitude of detected effects, it is helpful to 
represent them as a percentage change instead of absolute values. One way to do it, is to divide 
the treatment effect by the intercept. In the current models’ structure, the intercept would 
represent the average consumption for the control group during the pre-treatment period at 
zero Celsius temperature, on a Friday for weekday models and on Saturday for the weekend 
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model. Table 12 shows the calculated percentage changes for each treatment effect for each 
model. 
 
Treatment Weekday Weekend 
 
Dag Natt Natt 
MILJO effect -0.64*** 
 (-1.8%) 




KONKURRANSE effect -0.57***   
(-1.6%) 




SMART effect -0.22 
(-0.6%) 










Intercept  35.29 15.37 50.91 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Relative percentages are reported in parentheses 
Table 12 – Summary of the Results: Increase/decrease in consumption due to TOU 




As mentioned previously, all results should be interpreted in the context of TOT: What is the 
causal effect of those who are offered TOU and remain in the treatment group. The results 
show a statistically significant decrease in consumption when the daytime tariffs are active for 
MILJO and KONKURRANSE across the treatment period. However, SMART and INGEN 
do not show any statistically significant results. There are no statistically significant effects 
for MILJO and SMART during night tariff on weekdays, while KONKURRANSE has a small 
statistically significant decrease in consumption, and SMART has a slight increase.  On the 
weekends, it does not seem to be any statistical difference between either of the treatment 
groups and the control group, which suggests that TOU does not affect weekend consumption. 
On a monthly basis, INGEN has a statistically significant reduction in February during Dag. 
SMART has a reduction in November, while KONKURRANSE only sees a statistically 
significant reduction in January. MILJO has statistically significant reduction of consumption 
in both December and January. It should be noted that even if not all monthly values show 
statistically significant results, all the values except INGEN and SMART during January have 
a negative sign, which can possibly indicate reduction. 
 Internal Validity 
Even though statistically significant results show promise of a causal effect on 
KONKURRANSE and MILJO, we must assess the internal and external validity. The internal 
validity refers to how confident one is that the causal effect found is due to treatment and not 
due to other factors for this specific study. The framework by Slack & Draugalis (2001) will 
be used to assess the internal validity of this study.  
A potential problem for the internal validity of the study is the maturity of the participants, 
which may impact consumption due to the passage of time. As the span of the study is across 
a whole year, it is not unreasonable to believe that events that impact the results could happen. 
For instance, throughout a year a household might buy or sell an EV. Even though the decision 
to purchase or sell an EV is not due to treatment, an EV could impact the consumption of the 
household. Another example could be that someone in the household decides to move out, 
which would reduce the consumption. However, it is sensible to believe that the maturity 
 58
changes which impact consumption, will happen randomly across the groups. As the sample 
size in this study is sufficiently large, the effect of these changes will likely negate each other. 
Another aspect of the passage of time are factors that are external to customers, such as 
historical events. Natural disasters, such as landslides and drought are examples that could 
impact the results. For instance, landslides can do damage to the distribution network, which 
would prevent the customer from consuming electricity. As Norwegian power generation is 
heavily dependent on hydropower, a drought would have a tremendous impact on power 
generation. This will again result in higher spot prices, which is not directly related to the 
network tariff, but would still send a price signal to the same customer which could result in 
lower consumption. These threats are however dealt with through randomization. For instance, 
a landslide would have a very local impact on the power lines, but due to randomization, there 
will be a great geographical spread among participants. Such a local event would probably not 
impact the results if there were few participants in the area. An event that has an impact on a 
larger scale would distribute the shock evenly across the groups due to the large sample size. 
Another threat to the internal validity of the study is the experimental mortality, also known 
as attrition. When participants drop out from the study, the results pose the risk of being based 
on a biased sample. As participants leave, the strength of the initial randomization mitigates 
because the groups can end up being unequal. This is not a problem in itself, as DID can deal 
with an initial difference in groups and lack of randomization. However, another threat related 
to experimental mortality is that the results can appear more promising than they really are. 
When assigned participants withdraw from the study, the remaining participants tend to be 
more motivated to either reduce or shift their consumption. The logic being that if you have 
no plans to adjust according to treatment, there really is not any incentive to participate, which 
leads to attrition. Without access to the data of those who withdrew from the experiment, it is 
difficult to apply an ITT interpretation. However, this might be justified as the interesting 
interpretation in the eyes of a DSO is in the context of having TOU opposed to being offered. 
As the attrition rate is between 6% – 12.5% (See Table 1), one should indeed take note of this, 
however it is not high enough to be alarming. 
Most of the potential threats to internal validation are dealt with in a sufficient way, due to the 
large sample size, randomization, and random selection. One exception is the experimental 
mortality, which can potentially give biased results and should thus be kept in mind, but the 
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attrition rate is probably not high enough to impact the internal validity of the study. Thus, the 
results are most likely due to treatment. 
 External Validity 
The economic significance of the results stems from the ability to generalize the results from 
the treatment groups to the whole Elvia population of 900 000 households. For example, in 
case of rolling out the KONKURRANSE treatment to the whole population, a potential total 
reduction in consumption during a day would be around (0.69 kWh × 900 000) which is 621 
MWh. Consequently, this could have an impact by postponing upgrading the grid and reducing 
power loss. Nevertheless, the extent to which the study findings can be generalized requires 
discussing its external validity. 
The external validity refers to whether the results of the study can be generalized with different 
participants, experimenters, and settings. The framework presented by Bracht & Glass (1968) 
will be used to assess the external validity of this study. 
To assess the external validity of the study, Bracht & Glass (1968) suggest that dividing the 
threats into population validity and ecological validity. A threat related to the population 
validity is whether the experimental accessible population can be used to generalize the effect 
TOU has on the target population. The question is if the treatment effect of households is only 
applicable to the sample, or would similar results happen in the target population. Because the 
sample is randomly sampled from all the customers of Elvia, it is reasonable to believe that 
the results from the accessible population will give good generalization of the target 
population, which is Elvia’s customer base. However, it is more problematic to justify a 
generalization of other target populations. For instance, the results may not transfer if the target 
population is every household in Norway, when the accessible population is only located in 
the eastern parts of the country. Although it could give a rough estimation on the effect of the 
Norwegian population as a whole, relying on the results from this study to draw certain 
conclusions can be dangerous. 
In causal studies, one should beware of administering more than 1 treatment during the 
experiment. The initial TOU tariff did not give a sufficient monetary incentive for participants 
to partake in the study, which explains some of the attrition. To cope with the withdrawals, 
Elvia decided to change the TOU in such a way, that staying in the program while consuming 
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the same as before would result in cost-saving for the participants. This change was 
implemented in January 2021, which suggests that the treatment group was exposed to 2 
different treatments. This may be the reason there is a high reduction in January, but it could 
also be something completely different. Even though it is difficult to determine the actual 
effect of the higher incentive TOU, the goal of the study is not to compare TOUs of different 
levels of incentives. Rather, the goal is to determine whether TOU has an effect, and which 
communication strategy yields the best results. Because the change in tariffs happened at the 
same time across all the treatment groups, it should not be a problem in terms of validity. 
However, one should keep this in mind especially looking at the monthly values. 
 Comparing the Results to the Literature 
The decrease in consumption during the daytime for MILJO and KONKURRANSE agrees 
with the findings of Sæle & Grande (2011). As both studies take place in Norway, the 
institutional and cultural settings (such as dinner time) are closely related. Because of this, the 
results should be somewhat similar. In this thesis, the results show that MILJO give a reduction 
of 1.8% and KONKURRANSE successfully reduce consumption by 1.6%, while Sæle & 
Grande find that TOU result in a reduction of 4.25 One reason that they find a higher effect 
from treatment is probably due to the small sample size, which is only 40. While the customers 
of Elvia are randomly sampled and randomized into control/treatment, the participants in 
Malvik Everk’s pilot study are not randomly selected. The participants are close 
geographically and have a higher interest in electricity consumption than average. Some of the 
reduction in their study is also due to focusing on information meetings and stickers on the 
washing machines. This helps the participants to remember when it is more expensive to use 
the appliances. Also, the peak pricing is only active between 08:00 – 10:00 and 17:00 – 19:00, 
compared to 06 – 22 in Elvia. 
Although Klaassen et al. (2016) use dynamic prices opposed to TOU, their findings agree with 
our results, which is that higher prices during peak hours result in lower consumption in peak 
hours. They find a decrease in the evenings when the prices tend to be higher. Most of the load 
shifts to midday when PV generation is at its highest. They find a higher reduction (31%) in 
peak hour consumption than in this study, but it is not directly comparable as the households 
in their study are prosumers that can shift their load (20%) when PV generation is high. Also, 
the pricing model was dynamic pricing and not TOU.  
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The study by Bartusch et al. (2011) also shows similar results to this pilot study, however they 
find even greater reduction in consumption. They find a reduction of 11.1% the first year and 
14.2% the second year. The most probable explanation for these optimistic results is the high 
prices during peak hours and the price set to zero during off-peak hours. Even though Elvia 
set a lower price during defined off-peak hours compared to peak hours, the price is somewhat 
similar compared to prices in the control group. In order to recoup the zero rate hours, the peak 
hour prices must be set higher than what Elvia has decided. Thus, the larger price difference 
between consuming during peak hours and off-peak hours achieves higher incentives to reduce 
consumption. This reasoning also applies to the successful load shift from defined peak hours 
to off-peak hours. This suggests that Elvia can expect greater DR by choosing a similar 
strategy. 
Pon (2017) finds that TOU successfully reduce consumption during peak hours, but that it 
depends on information strategy. Bi-monthly billing results in a peak hour reduction of 4.92%, 
which has the smallest impact, while the treatment group that has access to IHD reduces 
consumption by 8.88%. The results are not directly comparable to this thesis, because the 
communication strategies used are different. However, both studies show that choosing the 
correct communications strategy is key for a successful TOU implementation. Pon’s results 
indicate that although IHD shows promise in the start of the study, the effect diminishes over 
time. This might also be the case in Elvia’s choice of communication strategies, but it is not 
easy to make a conclusion as this study’s analysis are only based on 4 months, while Pon 
analyzes the effect throughout a whole year. 
Torrito (2012) findings do not agree with either the results from this thesis or the additional 
literature reviewed. He finds that TOU on average increase consumption by 13.7% in Northern 
Italy. It is not obvious why the results differ as the research design is similar, and with a 
comparable price ratio between peak and off peak (0.57). But it could be that cultural 
differences between Norway and Italy are the explanation. Another potential reason is that 
participation in Torrito's study was non-voluntary. Also, the author mentions that the evening 
peak extends with TOU due to the lower price becoming active right after the initial peak. 
Because using electricity is cheaper the next hour, the Italian households might rationalize that 
they might as well continue using electricity. This is not the case with Elvia’s TOU design. 
The average Norwegian household uses more electricity than the average Italian household 
(IEA, n.d.). This means a small change in absolute consumption results in larger changes 
percentage wise. Torrito (2012) also mentions that the communication with the customers is 
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lacking as this was mostly done through previous paper bills. This underlines the importance 
of selecting a good communication strategy in tandem with TOU. 
 Problems Related to Elvia’s Pilot Project 
Except for the pilot study in Northern Italy (Torriti, 2012), the results presented in the thesis 
show lower DR compared to similar TOU studies. Some of the reasons are mentioned earlier, 
such as smart appliances and motivated control groups. However, the pricing model and the 
choice of intervention strategy may also explain the difference in results. In the Dag & Natt 
tariff, the peak hour prices are defined between 06:00 - 22:00. This means that the window for 
high prices is spread out across many hours. The tariff model used in the study of Sæle & 
Grande (2011) has defined peak hours between 08:00 - 10:00 and 17:00 - 19:00, while peak 
hours in the Irish residential study (Pon, 2017) has defined peak hours from 17:00 - 19:00. By 
choosing not to have shorter defined peak pricing hours, Elvia’s customers might not have a 
good enough incentive to shift load because the price will potentially be the same the next 12 
hours. Another advantage by having shorter defined peak pricing hours is that it gives the 
opportunity to set higher prices. Larger price differences will give the customer higher pay-
off by changing behavior.  
 Customer Perception - Ethical Aspects of TOU 
Customer perception refers to how customers feel about TOU. It is important to understand 
how customers perceive TOU, in order to achieve successful DR. If customers feel like the 
implemented tariff is unfair, they may get demotivated. Unmotivated customers in a real-world 
context may be less inclined to abide by the DSO’s suggestions on how to reduce or shift load. 
In this thesis, having motivated customers is not only important to achieve DR, but also to 
reduce attrition.  
Higher price disparity may result in higher DR, but as Naper et al (2016) learn, participants 
may find TOU to be unfair. The customers may feel those who are inflexible when it comes 
to reducing consumption during peak hours get punished. Another possible problem is that 
customers feel like they subsidize cheaper nighttime consumption for those who can utilize 
this time period better, like EV owners. The authors also find that people tend to think that 
they will be worse off with TOU tariffs, even though this is not necessarily true.  
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Even though TOU may make sense intuitively and rationally, it does not necessarily feel fair. 
Thus, it becomes clearer why information and choosing the correct communication strategy 
are crucial components to achieve successful DR with TOU.  
 Possible Explanations 
The basic intuition on how TOU should work is based on standard economic theory, where 
high demand with fixed supply will yield higher prices. The TOU framework sets high prices 
when the demand for electricity is high, and low prices when the demand is low. According 
to standard economic theory higher prices will also result in lower demand, which is 
essentially the goal of TOU: To lower the demand for electricity whenever the demand is high. 
A rational consumer thus wants to maximize his/her utility given by a utility function. Through 
this theory, one would expect a rational consumer to lower consumption during high priced 
periods, either by lowering overall consumption or shifting the load to periods with lower 
prices. 
This of course, depends on whether lowering consumption yields a higher pay off for the 
consumer compared to less convenience. For instance, a rational consumer who experiences 
hunger after work, and thus wants to make dinner, might still have a greater payoff from using 
the stove during peak hours. Experiencing hunger gives discomfort, and one can assume that 
a consumer would be price insensitive to electricity. The standard theory still holds in this 
scenario. However, it is reasonable to assume that not all electrical appliances are as time-
dependent and thus inflexible, as suggested by Torriti (2012) and Klaassen et al. (2016). For 
instance, charging an EV is probably not highly time-dependent/inflexible. The same may 
apply for heating (it is usually colder during the night, anyways), washing machines, dish 
washers and tumble dryers. If we assume that the usage of these appliances is flexible, then 
one might ask why consumption does not get reduced or shifts for all the intervention groups. 
It could be due to some unknown factor in the communication strategy negating the effect of 
TOU in the SMART and INGEN groups. It could also simply be due to the effect of TOU by 
itself is lacking, and thus it is the combination with communication that poses an 
effect.  Nevertheless, rational consumers would reduce their consumption of flexible and price 
sensitive appliances during peak hours to increase their utility. It may look like the standard 
economic model fails to explain why SMART and INGEN do not have a statistically 
significant reduction during high tariff hours.  
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If standard economic theory fails to explain the results, maybe alternative theories can. 
According to DellaVigna (2009), laboratory results indicate that attention is a limited resource. 
By using his theory about limited attention, electricity can be perceived as a good that is 
divided into a visible and opaque component. Because the electricity bill in Norway consists 
of the electricity price, expenses, and the network tariff. This means an inattentive consumer 
will see the network tariff on the bill, but not fully process it, which may lead to less change 
in behavior by changing the price of the network tariff. Naper et al. (2016) find that households 
usually include electricity price when thinking of network tariff, which suggests that the spot 
price might be the more visible component of cost. One reason that the spot price has a higher 
visibility might be because it changes more often than the network tariff.  
It is also reasonable to decompose the network tariff by the fixed part and the variable part, 
where the fixed part is the visible component, while the variable part is the opaque component. 
Higher consumption does not increase the cost associated with the fixed part, but it does 
impact the cost through the variable part. Thus, higher consumption will not increase the 
customers perceived cost dramatically, as the cost increases through the opaque variable part. 
Furthermore, changing the price of the variable part will yield a neglectable higher perceived 
cost.  
If reducing the inattention associated with the network tariff’s variable part (increasing the 
salience of it) will result in a more effective TOU model, then one must question why just 
some communication strategies in Elvia’s pilot study result in statistically significant 
reduction of consumption, while others do not. The reasoning may simply be that INGEN and 
SMART fail to reduce the inattention related to the costs and benefits associated with TOU. 
While INGEN does not focus on a specific communication strategy, SMART tries to persuade 
consumers to reduce peak hours consumption by focusing on the opportunity to save money. 
If appealing to cost saving does not pose any statistically significant effect, it is difficult to 
accept that inattention to the variable cost is the only explanation. Focusing on the price would 
intuitively yield higher salience of the variable cost, compared to MILJO and 
KONKURRANSE, which focus on other aspects linked to lowering consumption. Therefore, 
it is interesting to find that MILJO and KONKURRANSE have statistically significant results 
while SMART does not. 
The statistically significant results from MILJO suggests that consumers do not behave purely 
on self-interest. Although it is true that the environment impacts everyone to a certain degree, 
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the environment can be classified as a public good. This implies that consumers would have 
an incentive to be free riders. Because focusing on the environment yields better results than 
pure cost saving, consumers’ utility may not be entirely dependent on their own pay-off.  
A model developed by Charness & Rabin (2002) takes altruism into account. In their model, 
if a consumer is altruistic, he or she will have a higher utility when sharing the pay-off than 
keeping it only for him/herself. Because the environment is a shared good, a better 
environment by conserving electricity will result in a shared pay-off, and thus a higher utility 
for the consumer.  
Regarding the statistically significant effects of KONKURRANSE, Abrahamse et al. (2005) 
mention comparative feedback as a measure to achieve the sense of competition and social 
pressure. Ayres et al. (2009) find that comparative feedback reduces energy consumption. 
However, throughout the experiment, Elvia has not distributed any form of feedback to 
compare a household's consumption relative to others. Nonetheless, the underlying sense of 
social pressure and competition may have a positive impact on reducing consumption even 
without feedback.  
 Limitations and Further Research  
In this section, we discuss several different points that could be a potential for future research. 
Based on aforementioned hypothesized explanations of the results, there could be many 
experiments to test it: 
- Testing whether reducing the inattention to the network tariff’s variable part by 
manipulating the consumers' salience of TOU, will have a greater effect. This can be 
empirically tested by removing the fixed part of the network tariff for a treatment 
group, while the control group will continue with both a fixed- and a variable part. 
 
- To empirically test whether altruism plays a role in reducing electricity consumption, 
one can introduce the following experiment to a sample of participants: a treatment 
group will receive monetary compensation when they manage to save on their 
electricity bill. The same value will also be distributed to their neighbors; however, 
they save it only at specific low consumption levels of electricity at certain hours that 
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implies forced inconvenience. 
 
- For testing whether providing social comparative feedback can have a greater impact 
or not, this can be done by implementing a field experiment by using an app. To test 
the causal effect of feedback, the treatment group(s) of the app will be able to compare 
their reduced energy usage against a group of similar households, or even 
friends/neighbors. On the other hand, the control group will not have this comparison 
feature in the app.  
 
- From the literature, goal setting seems to be effective measures to achieve energy 
reduction. Elvia would benefit by investigating this further by setting high goals for 
energy reduction to one or more treatment groups. If results from such research are 
promising, the goal setting intervention should be an easy and a cheap measure to 
implement. As the current intervention strategy relies on communicating information 
to the customer’s, the outcome can simply be to increase knowledge and not behavioral 
change in the long run. Thus, Elvia should try to combine future communication with 
interventions such as comparative and frequent feedback. 
Interventions often have heterogeneous effects on the population they affect. That means 
consumers in each experimental group respond differently to the treatment, the detected effects 
represent only the average of effects across the whole treatment sample, but in reality, it could 
be that the effects vary from one consumer to another. There could be many characteristics of 
consumers that affect how they respond to the treatment, in terms of how much flexibility they 
have to change their consumption pattern or reduce it. Examples of these characteristics: 
- Magnitude of consumption: it could be that households that already consume relatively 
high electricity have more absolute flexibility to reduce or change the time of their 
consumption in comparison to the households which consume relatively low. 
- Load profile: a retired family would have a different load profile than a working family, 
different load profiles could have different amounts of flexibility to manipulate their 
consumption.  
- Economic income: low-income consumers could respond differently to monetary 
incentives than high income consumers. 
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Studying the effects of the treatments on different types of consumers could be an interesting 
future research extension of this study. 
The current study analyzes the effects of the treatments for only four months since the starting 
of the treatment. Tracking the treatment's effects for more months can clarify if the treatment 
effects would be attenuated over time or still at the same levels.   
This study shows that the effects of the treatments are due to reduction in consumption rather 
than a shifting in consumption. However, there is a big potential to explore the effects of 
shifting consumption by automation systems as a response to price signal. Existing automation 
solutions in the market depend on electricity hourly spot price only in order to optimize 
electricity consumption that gives the best economic benefits for the consumers at their 
tolerated convenience levels. By introducing TOU tariff, it is interesting to see the treatment 
effects on consumers who have smart systems that could optimize their electricity 
consumption based on the merge between sport price and grid tariff.  
Electricity is usually consumed by more than one member living in the household. However, 
in this study and in order to assure that the experiment users are not exposed to more than one 
treatment at the same time, Elvia preferred to communicate with the customers via direct 
communication means such as emails and mobile phone messages registered by the contracts’ 
owners, this may imply that the content of the messages may not be received by other 
household members. The inability of confirming that all members of the same household read 
the message, can be avoided in rolling out the new tariff to the general public by using mass 
communication means like social media or TV. 
The experiment period had many lockdowns in the Oslo area because of Covid-19 epidemic. 
This implies that many consumers had home offices and were staying in homes during the 
whole day. Would consumers be able to shift some of their consumption to Natt hours if they 
would have been outside home! This can be investigated in future research. 
Spot price effect was not included in this study. Although both treatment and control groups 
have the same spot price, treatment groups could be more sensitive to spot price information 
or news in the media since they are already part of an experiment.  
Through the analysis, the hours with the highest consumption have not been isolated as the 
defined peak hours prices in the TOU model last across the day. The DID model is easily 
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adjustable to fit these research questions, by analyzing sub samples, for instance certain hours 
of the day. However, this would best suit a TOU model which has few peak hours per day 
rather than an extended one like the one in this study. 
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7. Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis is to measure the causal effect of the byproduct of TOU and 
communication strategies, on Elvia’s end users' electric consumption. Despite the random 
assignments of participants into the different treatment groups, an initial analysis shows that 
there are statistically significant differences between the groups in terms of average 
consumption before starting the experiment. This requires finding a modeling technique that 
can take into consideration the pre-existing differences. DID is such a technique that can 
accurately assess the treatments’ effects.  This has been achieved by comparing the treatment 
groups to a control group, before and after the experiment.  
By adding further interventions in combination to with TOU, one can nudge customers into 
changing their behavior, which can potentially result in greater reduction in consumption than 
without. By using existing literature, this thesis tries to explain why the results depend greatly 
on interventions such as communication strategy, and how Elvia may improve the effects of 
TOU by using different and/or additional interventions. From the literature, it seems like 
frequent feedback about the household’s consumption can be good interventions. The 
feedback could be comparative in nature to achieve even greater results. 
The current literature is approximately 10 years old. Many of the studies’ participants are not 
randomly assigned to the treatment and have small sample sizes. The current study adds to the 
available literature by implementing a controlled randomized field experiment which includes 
several thousand participants. Additionally, this study also tests the effectiveness of various 
communication strategies. The results should have a strong claim on the causal effect of TOU 
in today’s Norwegian electricity market. 
The results show that the communication strategies that focus on either competition or the 
environment give statistically significant results in the four months from November 2020 
to February 2021. The results show that the overall consumption in defined peak hours reduces 
by 0.57 kWh with a communication strategy focusing on competition, while the 
communication strategy focusing on the environmental aspect shows a reduction of 0.64 kWh. 
Although both the neutral and the smart/price fixated communication strategies do not show 
statistical significance reduction in consumption during the day compared to the 
counterfactual. The analysis shows that reduction during peak hours was part of overall 
reduction during the whole daily 24 hours. 
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Based on the results of this experiment, we recommend that a Norwegian DSO that wants to 
affect the electricity consumption of its customer, it would be better to design a communication 
strategy based on environmental and social pressure messages, rather than economic saving 
ones. Furthermore, providing feedback to the customers has been proven to be effective from 
the literature. 
Future research should be focused on finding the effect of different communication strategies 
on different types of customers. Furthermore, finding the effect of using automation systems 
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B1 – Difference between groups (pre-analysis) 
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N 830976 830976 830976 830976 
R-Squared 0 0 0.01 0.01 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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B2 – Dag Model  
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N 1188808 1188808 1181900 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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(Intercept) 0.003 35.14 35.43 
day_weekMon 0.0003 0.417 0.72 
day_weekThu -0.0039 0.16 0.47 
day_weekTue -0.0011 0.357 0.66 
day_weekWed -0.002 -0.24 0.02 
temp -0.0001 -1.26 -1.18 
INGEN -0.007 1.28 1.66 
post -0.001 2.25 2.57 
SMART -0.001 3.56 3.991 
KONKURRANSE -0.003 0.821 1.21 
MILJO -0.001 0.074 0.46 
post:INGEN 0.011 -0.566 0.007 
post:SMART -0.003 -0.524 0.08 
post:KONKURRANSE 0.0033 -0.878 -0.27 









B4 – Month Vs Month Model  
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N 284475 312997 305920 278508 
R-Squared 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.06 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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B5 – Natt Model  
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Intercept) 
15.95 ***  
(0.03) 
16.09 ***  
(0.04) 
15.37 ***  
(0.04) 
post 
1.59 ***  
(0.04) 
1.59 ***  
(0.04) 
0.74 ***  
(0.04) 
INGEN 
0.71 ***  
(0.05) 
0.71 ***  
(0.05) 
0.71 ***  
(0.05) 
SMART 
1.75 ***  
(0.05) 
1.75 ***  
(0.05) 
1.75 ***  
(0.05) 
KONKURRANSE 
0.49 ***  
(0.05) 
0.49 ***  
(0.05) 










0.19 **  
(0.07) 
0.19 **  
(0.07) 
























 -0.36 ***  
(0.04) 
0.12 **  
(0.04) 
day_weekThu 
 0.03  
(0.04) 
0.11 **  
(0.04) 
day_weekTue 
 -0.25 ***  
(0.04) 
0.11 **  
(0.04) 
day_weekWed 





  -0.61 ***  
(0.00) 
N 1191834 1191834 1184920 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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B6 – Natt weekend  













































































  -1.74 *** 
(0.01) 
N 494152 494152 494152 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 





B7 – Total effect 
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Intercept) 
52.14 ***  
(0.07) 
52.84 ***  
(0.11) 
50.63 ***  
(0.11) 
INGEN 
2.14 ***  
(0.13) 
2.14 ***  
(0.13) 
2.13 ***  
(0.13) 
post 
6.05 ***  
(0.10) 
6.06 ***  
(0.10) 
3.24 ***  
(0.10) 
SMART 
5.49 ***  
(0.13) 
5.49 ***  
(0.13) 
5.49 ***  
(0.13) 
KONKURRANSE 
1.51 ***  
(0.13) 
1.51 ***  
(0.13) 
1.51 ***  
(0.13) 
MILJO 
0.33 *  
(0.13) 
0.33 *  
(0.13) 


















-0.68 ***  
(0.19) 
-0.68 ***  
(0.19) 
-0.69 ***  
(0.19) 
Post:MILJO 
-0.60 **  
(0.19) 
-0.60 **  
(0.19) 
-0.61 **  
(0.18) 
day_weekMon  -1.00 ***  
(0.12) 
0.67 ***  
(0.12) 
day_weekSay  -0.04  
(0.12) 
0.36 **  
(0.11) 
day_weekSun  -2.25 ***  
(0.12) 
-0.35 **  
(0.11) 
day_weekThu  -0.11  
(0.12) 
0.41 ***  
(0.12) 
day_weekTue  -0.74 ***  
(0.12) 
0.61 ***  
(0.12) 




temp   -1.79 ***  
(0.01) 
N 1675323 1675323 1675323 
R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.05 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
